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Abstract
The success of bootstrapping or replacing a human judge with a model (e.g., an equation)
has been demonstrated in Paul Meehl’s (1954) seminal work and bolstered by the results of
several meta-analyses. To date, however, analyses considering different types of meta-
analyses as well as the potential dependence of bootstrapping success on the decision
domain, the level of expertise of the human judge, and the criterion for what constitutes an
accurate decision have been missing from the literature. In this study, we addressed these
research gaps by conducting a meta-analysis of lens model studies. We compared the
results of a traditional (bare-bones) meta-analysis with findings of a meta-analysis of the
success of bootstrap models corrected for various methodological artifacts. In line with pre-
vious studies, we found that bootstrapping was more successful than human judgment. Fur-
thermore, bootstrapping was more successful in studies with an objective decision criterion
than in studies with subjective or test score criteria. We did not find clear evidence that the
success of bootstrapping depended on the decision domain (e.g., education or medicine) or
on the judge’s level of expertise (novice or expert). Correction of methodological artifacts
increased the estimated success of bootstrapping, suggesting that previous analyses with-
out artifact correction (i.e., traditional meta-analyses) may have underestimated the value of
bootstrapping models.
Introduction
Across a variety of settings, human judges are often replaced or ‘bootstrapped’ by decision-
making models (e.g., equations) in order to increase the accuracy of important—and often
ambiguous—decisions, such as reaching a medical diagnosis or choosing a candidate for a par-
ticular job (see [1]). Before we outline our work on the success of bootstrapping models, it
should be noted that the term bootstrapping is applied in a variety of different contexts, for
instance for a statistical method of resampling (see [2]). Here we use the term bootstrapping
in the same way that it is used in the research on judgment and decision making (see [3]).
However, we would like to make the reader aware of its different uses in different contexts.
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In the judgment and decision-making research on bootstrapping, existing reviews and
meta-analyses have suggested that models tend to be more accurate than human judges [4–10].
However, results of previous analyses have also pointed to a wide heterogeneity in the success
of bootstrapping [8]. In a previous study [11], we suggested that the success of bootstrapping
might depend on the decision domain (e.g., medical or business) as well as on the level of
expertise of the decision makers.
To date, however, no meta-analysis has systematically evaluated the success of bootstrap-
ping models across different decision domains or based on the expertise of the human decision
maker. Furthermore, to date no review has compared the success of bootstrapping models as a
function of the type of evaluation criterion for what constitutes an ‘accurate’ decision. We
therefore do not know if bootstrapping is more successful if the evaluation criterion is, for
instance, objective, subjective, or a test score (e.g., a student’s test score versus a teacher’s judg-
ment of student performance). Finally, as previous meta-analyses did not correct for measure-
ment error or other methodological artifacts [9], the extent of possible bias in the results of
these analyses is currently unknown.
In this study, we conduct a meta-analysis of the success of bootstrapping using the lens
model framework. We investigate whether the success of bootstrapping varies across decision
domains (e.g., medical or business), the expertise of the human decision maker (expert or nov-
ice), or the criterion for a ‘successful decision’ (objective, subjective, or based on a test score).
We then compare the results of traditional, ‘bare-bones’meta-analysis (i.e., only corrected for
sampling error, see [12] p. 94) with the results of psychometric meta-analysis in which we were
able to correct for a number of potential methodological artifacts [12]. It should be noted that
we applied psychometric corrections in a previous paper [11] and that we are using these psy-
chometric-corrected indices for a more comprehensive evaluation of bootstrapping models in
the present paper. Hence, the part on the psychometric analysis in our previous study is closely
linked to the work presented here, as we used the results of a previous analysis for additional
evaluations presented in this paper in the following. We would like to make the interested
reader aware that the scope of our previous work was different than in the following. In addi-
tion to that, the criteria for including studies in the two meta-analyses are different (e.g., our
first paper focused on the evaluation of single lens model indexes, whereas our present paper
focuses on a combination of lens model indexes). This study covers issues not considered in
our first paper. For example, we also consider expertise level within domains and evaluation
criteria. Hence, this paper is an extension of the first one, which supplements it. The link
between the two papers is the second database in this paper (see ‘study identification’ and ‘sec-
ond database’ below), which we reused from our first paper. Hence, also our analytical strategy
applying to the second sample depends on our previous analysis, which was presented in our
first paper.
Taken together, by adding an additional database, an alternative analytical strategy, and a
comparison of the results, we scrutinize the validity of our conclusion that bootstrapping is
actually successful. Due to the additional check with this second paper, we also gain greater
and more detailed insights into the evaluation of the success of bootstrapping models.
Importantly, the studies in both papers represent exclusively decision-making tasks that
mirror actual, real-life decision-making conditions most closely, thus providing the most
appropriate evaluation of bootstrapping [13].
Success of bootstrapping: Previous research
The success of bootstrapping models has been evaluated in several reviews, beginning with
Meehl’s seminal evaluation in his book, Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction [14]. In this first
Linear Bootstrapping Models
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systematic review of the success of bootstrapping, Meehl summarized 20 studies and concluded
that models led to better decisions than decisions made by humans, jumpstarting the “man ver-
sus model of man” debate. Since then, several meta-analyses have evaluated the success of boot-
strapping, following either a traditional or a lens model approach, as outlined below.
Traditional approaches. Reviews taking a traditional approach have generally concluded
that models lead to more accurate decisions than human judgment does, although the results
have also pointed to heterogeneity in the success of bootstrapping. For instance, based on the
results of a meta-analysis of 136 studies, Grove et al. [7] concluded that model prediction was
typically as accurate as or more accurate than human prediction, but they noted that there
were also some instances in which human prediction was as good as or even better than model
prediction. Notably, the results of Grove et al. [7] were specific to medical and psychological
decisions and do not necessarily generalize to other decision domains (e.g., nonhuman out-
comes such as horse races, weather, or stock market prices). Tetlock [10] and Aegisdottir et al.
[4] reached similar conclusions based on their respective reviews of political predictions and
counseling tasks. Finally, focusing on potential domain differences in the success of bootstrap
models across psychological, educational, financial, marketing, and personnel decision-making
tasks, Armstrong [5] concluded that bootstrapping led to more accurate decisions in eight
tasks, less accurate decisions in one task, and equally accurate decisions in two tasks.
Lens model approach. Relative to other approaches, one advantage of using the lens
model framework to evaluate the success of bootstrapping is that one can take into account dif-
ferent human judgment and decision-making strategies. Different kinds of models can be used
to bootstrap decision processes. Ecological or actual models are based on the past observed
relationship between any number of pieces of information (cues) and a particular outcome. An
example of an ecological model is when a linear multiple regression equation based on the past
observed relationship between a number of cues (e.g., breast tumor, family history) and actual
breast cancer disease is used to make a breast cancer diagnosis [9]. Whereas ecological models
ignore human judgment and decision-making strategies, bootstrapping models in the lens
model approach take into account the different ways in which decision makers integrate differ-
ent pieces of information to reach a decision (i.e., non-linear vs. linear). With a non-linear deci-
sion-making strategy, the decision maker (e.g., physician) uses a single piece of information,
such as whether or not a breast tumor is present. The fast-and-frugal heuristic is a well-known
non-linear model (e.g., [15]). Although such non-linear models are generally considered to be
particularly user friendly (see e.g., [16]), research has predominantly focused on linear boot-
strap models that include multiple cues. Hence, in addition to the presence or absence of a
breast tumor, a physician might also consider additional information, such as whether there is
a family history of breast cancer. Taking into account such a linear decision-making strategy is
also possible within the lens model framework [17, 18]. Thus, using the lens model framework
to analyze the success of linear bootstrap models offers the best way to evaluate the success of
bootstrapping.
The success of bootstrapping by lens model indices. Within the lens model framework,
the success or ‘judgment achievement’ of a decision-making process is expressed by the lens
model equation, which is a precise, mathematical identity that describes judgment achievement
(ra) as the product of knowledge (G), environmental validity (Re), and consistency (Rs) plus an
unmodeled component (C) (see Eq 1):
ra ¼ GRsRe þ C
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 R2s
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 R2e
p ð1Þ
where
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ra = the achievement index (i.e., the correlation between a person’s judgment and a specific
criterion),
Re = the environmental validity index (i.e., the multiple correlation of the cues with the
criterion),
Rs = consistency (i.e., the multiple correlation of the cues with the person’s estimates),
G = a knowledge index, which is error-free achievement (i.e., the correlation between the
predicted levels of the criterion and the predicted judgments), and
C = an unmodeled knowledge component, which is the correlation between the variance
not captured by the environmental predictability component or the consistency component
(i.e., the correlation between the residuals from the above achievement index).
According to Camerer [6] and Goldberg [19], the product of the components knowledge
(G) and environmental validity (Re) captures the validity of the bootstrapping model. By
including the knowledge component (G) in the evaluation of the bootstrapping model, we
assume that the human judge uses a linear judgment and decision-making strategy, that is, that
the judge integrates at least two pieces of information. The degree to which replacing a human
judge with a decision-making model improves the success of the decision-making process can
be quantified by subtracting judgment achievement from the product term GRe (see [6] p. 413,
see Eq 2).
D ¼ GRe  ra ð2Þ
Reviews using the lens model framework and the lens model equation have included eco-
logical models (see [9]) as well as models considering the judgment and decision-making strat-
egy (i.e., linear vs. non-linear). The classic review by Camerer [6] on the success of linear
bootstrap models supported the conclusion that bootstrapping with linear models works well
across different types of judgment tasks. However, it should be noted that Camerer [6] included
laboratory tasks in his review, in violation of the demand for ecological validity applying to
studies in the lens model tradition. The results of the more recent analysis by Karelaia and
Hogarth [8] were in line with Camerer [6], although the authors pointed out the high heteroge-
neity of the success of bootstrapping across tasks and highlighted the need to identify the task
and judge characteristics that favor bootstrapping. Previous reviews on lens model indices indi-
cated wide heterogeneity (see [20]) and implied domain differences in lens model statistics (see
[21, 11]), suggesting that judgment achievement is different in different decision domains (e.g.,
medicine, business, education, psychology) and in turn implying that the success of bootstrap-
ping models is also domain-dependent. Indeed, these preliminary results suggesting that the
success of bootstrapping was domain-dependent highlight the need for more detailed analysis.
Hence, this paper extends our previous paper (see [11]).
The present study
In this study, we conduct a meta-analysis of lens model studies to evaluate the success of linear
bootstrapping models. Our meta-analysis is unique and extends our previous paper by focusing
specifically on differences in the success of bootstrapping based on the decision domain, the
expertise of the human decision maker (expert or novice), and the criterion for an accurate
decision (objective, subjective, or test score). An analysis of this kind is needed to identify spe-
cific contexts in which bootstrapping is likely to be more successful. In addition, in a second
evaluation, we use psychometrically corrected lens model values to construct the bootstrapping
model. Previous reviews have not corrected for potential artifacts (e.g., measurement error),
which potentially leads to biased estimations [9]. We are therefore the first to evaluate the suc-
cess of psychometrically-corrected bootstrapping models in detail.
Linear Bootstrapping Models
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Methods
Before describing our study identification strategy and databases in detail, we describe the two
different analytical strategies used in this study. As different conditions are required for each
analytical strategy, we had two different databases. Hence, we report the process of study iden-
tification and give detailed study descriptions for the two databases separately.
Study identification
First database. To identify lens model studies to be included in the meta-analysis, we
checked the database by Kaufmann et al. [11] as well as the studies included in Camerer [6]
and Kuncel et al. [9] (Fig 1). Please note that Kaufmann et al. [11] focused on artifact correc-
tion of the lens model components as opposed to the success of bootstrapping models as in this
study; hence, they excluded some of the studies included in Camerer [6] from their database.
We excluded all studies with feedback or learning opportunities (e.g., [22]; for details we refer
to [11]). We argue that excluding studies in which decision makers received feedback on the
accuracy of their decisions is more appropriate for evaluating the success of human judgment
accuracy relative to bootstrapping in real-life conditions, in which human decision makers
rarely receive such feedback.
Tables 1 and 2 show the lens model studies identified through the search procedure, orga-
nized by decision domain and decision-maker expertise (expert versus novice). In sum, 35
studies met the inclusion criteria for the first meta-analysis.
Second database. A subset of 31 studies in the database described above met the inclusion
criteria for the evaluation of artifact-corrected bootstrapping models (see [11]). In Tables 1 and
2, this subset of studies is labeled with an ‘s’ for subsample in the last column. We also point
out here that in contrast to the first database, the second database is the same as in Kaufmann
et al. [11]
Fig 1. The process of identifying relevant studies for the meta-analysis.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157914.g001
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Table 1. Studies included in the meta-analyses by decision domain and decision-maker expertise.
Study Judges Number of
judgments
Number of
cues
Judgment task Criterion Task
results
a) Medical science, experts:
1) Nystedt & Magnusson
[23]
4 clinical
psychologists
38 3 Judge patients based on
patient
Rating on three I: Δ1 = .11
protocols: psychological tests
(&)
II: Δ2 = .03
I: intelligence II: Δ3 = .12
II: ability to establish
contact
(*, +, s)
III: control of affect and
impulses
2) Levi [24] 9 nuclear medicine 280 5 Assess probability of
signiﬁcant
Coronary
angiography
Δ4 = .07
physicians (60 replications) coronary artery disease
based on patient
(*, s)
proﬁles
3) LaDuca, Engel, &
Chovan [25]
13 physicians 30 5 Judge the degree of
severity
A single
physician’s
Δ5 = .08
(congestive heart failure)
based on
judgment (▲) (*, s)
patient proﬁles
4) Smith, Gilhooly, &
Walker [26]
40 general
practitioners
20 8 Decision to prescribe an
antidepressant
Guideline expert
(▲)
Δ6 = -.05
based on patient proﬁle (s)
5a) Einhorn [27] (This
publication
3 pathologists III: 193 9 Evaluate the severity of
Hodgkin’s
Actual number of III: Δ7 = -.01
contains two studies) disease based on biopsy
slides
months of survival (s)
Second study
6a) Grebstein [28] 10 clinical experts 30 proﬁles 10 Judge Wechsler-Bellevue
IQ scores
IQ test scores (&) Δ8 = -.17
(varying in amounts
of
from Rorschach
psychograms
Δ9 = -.14
clinical experience)
5b Einhorn [27] 29 clinicians I: 77 MMPI
proﬁles
11 Judge the degree of
neuroticism-
Actual diagnosis
(&)
Δ10 = .02
First study (This
publication
II: 181 MMPI
proﬁles
psychoticism Δ110 = -.05
Contains two studies) (*, +, s)
7) Todd (1955, see [29]),
Note 3
10 clinical judges 78 19 Estimate patient IQ from
the Rorschach
IQ test scores (&) Δ12 = .05
test
8) Speroff, Connors, &
Dawson
123 physicians: 440 32 Judge intensive care unit
patients’
Patients’ actual Δ13 = .05
[30] 105 house staff, hemodynamic status hemodynamic
status
(s)
15 fellows, (physicians’ estimation)
3 attending
physicians
Novices:
6b) Grebstein [28] 5 students 30 10 Judge Wechsler-Bellevue
IQ scores
IQ test scores (&) Δ14 = -.19
(Continued)
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Table 1. (Continued)
Study Judges Number of
judgments
Number of
cues
Judgment task Criterion Task
results
from Rorschach
psychograms based on
paper proﬁles
b) Business science,
experts:
9) Ashton [31] 13 executives,
managers,
42 5 Predict advertising sales for
Time
Actual advertising
pages
Δ15 = .07
sales personnel magazine based on case
descriptions
sold (*, +, s)
10) Roose & Doherty [32] 16 agency
managers
200 / 160 64 / 5 Predict the success of life
insurance
One-year criterion
for
Δ16 = -.08
salesmen based on paper
proﬁles
success (*, +, s)
11) Goldberg [33] 43 bank loan
ofﬁcers
60 5 Predict bankruptcy
experience based on
Actual bankruptcy Δ17 = .03
large corporation proﬁles experience
12) Kim, Chung, &
Paradice [34]
3 experienced loan 119 7 Judge whether a ﬁrm would
be able to
Actual ﬁnancial
data
I: Δ18 = .09
ofﬁcers I: 60 big ﬁrms, repay the loan requested
based on
II: Δ19 = .02
II: 59 small ﬁrms ﬁnancial proﬁles (*, +, s)
13) Mear & Firth [35] 38 professional
security
30 10 Predict security returns
based on
Actual security
returns
Δ20 = .03
analysts ﬁnancial proﬁles (s)
14) Ebert & Kruse [36] 5 securities
analysts
35 22 Estimate future returns of
common
Actual returns Δ21 = .06
stocks
15) Wright [37] 47 students 50 4 Predict price changes for
stocks from
Actual stock prices Δ22 = .06
1970 until 1971 based on
paper proﬁles
(*, +, s)
of securities
16) Harvey & Harries [38] 24 psychology
students
40 Not Forecast sales outcomes
based on paper
Actual sales
outcome
Δ23 = -.07
(1. experiment) known proﬁles (s)
17) Singh, 1990 [39] 52 business
students
35 Not Estimate of the stock price
of a
Actual stock prices Δ24 = .02
known company based on paper
proﬁles
(s)
c) Educational science,
experts:
18) Dawes [40] 1 admission
committee
111 4 Admission decision for
graduate school
Faculty ratings of l Δ25 = .06
based on paper proﬁles performance in
graduate
school (▲)
19) Cooksey, Freebody, &
Davidson
20 teachers 118 5 Judge I: Reading
comprehension
I-II: End-of-year
test
I: Δ26 = .04
[41] And II: Word knowledge of scores (&) II: Δ27 = .04
kindergarten children based
on paper
(*, +, s)
(Continued)
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Table 1. (Continued)
Study Judges Number of
judgments
Number of
cues
Judgment task Criterion Task
results
proﬁles
Novices:
20) Wiggins & Kohen [42] 98 psychology
graduate
110 10 Forecast ﬁrst-year-graduate
grade point
Actual ﬁrst-year- Δ28 = .17
students averages based on paper
proﬁles
graduate grade
point
(s)
averages
21) Wiggins, Gregory, &
Diller,
41 psychology
students
90 10 Forecast ﬁrst-year-graduate
grade point
Actual ﬁrst-year- Δ29 = .06
see Dawes and
Corrigan [43],
averages based on paper
proﬁles
graduate grade
point
repl. Wiggins and
Kohen [42]
averages
22) Athanasou & Cooksey
[44]
18 technical and
further
120 20 Judge whether students are
interested in
Actual level of
students’
Δ30 = .07
education students learning based on paper
proﬁle
interest (*, +, s)
d) Psychological science,
experts:
23) Szucko & Kleinmuntz
[45]
6 experienced
polygraph
30 3–4 Judge truthful / untruthful
response
Actual theft Δ31 = -.06
interpreters based on polygraph
protocols
(*, +, s)
24) Cooper & Werner [46] 18 33 17 Forecast violent behavior
during the
Actual violent
behavior
Δ32 = .00
(9 psychologists, ﬁrst six months of
incarceration based
during the ﬁrst six (s)
9 case managers) on inmates’ data forms months of
imprisonment
25) Werner, Rose,
Murdach, &
5 social workers 40 19 Predict imminent violence
of
Actual violent acts Δ33 = .03
Yesavage [47] psychiatric inpatients in the
ﬁrst 7 days
in the ﬁrst 7 days (*, +, s)
following admission based
on
following
admission
admission data
26) Werner, Rose, &
Yesavage [48]
30 40 19 Predict male patients’
violent behavior
Actual violence
during
Δ34 = .06
(15 psychologists, during the ﬁrst 7 days
following
the ﬁrst 7 days
following
(s)
15 psychiatrists) admission based on case
material
admission
Novices:
27) Gorman, Clover, &
Doherty [49]
8 students 75: I, III: 12 Predict students’ scores on
an attitude
Actual data: I: Δ35 = .73
I, III: 50 II, IV: 6 scale (I, II) and a
psychology
I, II: Attitude scale II: Δ36 = .67
II, IV: 25 examination (III, IV) based
on
III, IV: Examination
scale
III: Δ37 = .01
interviews (I, III) and paper
proﬁles
(&) IV: Δ38 =
.29
(Continued)
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Further details on the construction of our databases, such as our search protocol, are avail-
able in Kaufmann [58].
Study descriptions
First database. We identified studies within five decision domains: medical science (8
studies), business science (9 studies), educational science (5 studies), psychological science (6
studies), and miscellaneous (7 studies). Most judgments were based on paper profiles, i.e., writ-
ten descriptions (see [59]). Overall, the number of cues ranged from two [53] to 64 [32]. The
number of decision makers in the studies ranged from three [27, 34] to 123 [30]. The majority
of the studies included novice decision makers (predominantly students). The number of deci-
sions ranged from 25 [26] to 440 [30]. The meta-analysis included evaluation of 52 different
decision tasks. Tables 1 and 2 also describe the criterion in each study. Notably, some studies
included an objective criterion, such as the actual weather temperature (see [52]), and other
studies included a subjective criterion, such as a physician’s judgment (see [25]). Subjective cri-
teria are indicated by black triangles in Tables 1 and 2, and test score criteria (e.g., [23]) are
indicated by a square. Criteria not specially labeled are objective criteria.
As Table 1 shows, we identified eight studies within medical science, which included 241
experts (e.g., clinical psychologists) and five novices and 14 different tasks. The studies within
the medical science domain included the studies with both the overall lowest and the overall
highest number of judgments. In the first study by Einhorn [27], the three pathologists were
the only decision makers who based their judgments on real biopsy slides, which represented a
more natural situation than the commonly used paper patient profiles. We identified nine
studies within business science, including 40 bootstrapping models by 241 persons for 10 dif-
ferent tasks. Please note that the study by Wright [37] analyzed only the five most accurate
judgments made by the 47 persons included at the idiographic level. Studies within business
science had the widest range of number of cues (4 to 64). All judgments were based on paper
profiles. We identified five studies within educational science, two studies with expert decision
makers and three with novice decision makers. In the two studies with experts, 41 bootstrap-
ping models in three tasks were considered. Cooksey, Freedbody, and Davidson [41] included
a multivariate lens model design, supplemented with two single lens model designs. In the
Table 1. (Continued)
Study Judges Number of
judgments
Number of
cues
Judgment task Criterion Task
results
(II, IV) (*, s) (.08),
see
Camerer [6]
28) Lehman [50] 14 students 40 19 Assess imminent violence
of male
Actual violent acts
in the
Δ39 = -.01
patients in the ﬁrst 7 days
following
ﬁrst 7 days
following
(*, +, s)
admission based on case
material
admission
▲ = subjective criterion;
& = test criterion;
(*) = idiographic approach (cumulating across individuals);
(*, +) = both research approaches are considered;
Δ = the success of bootstrapping models (see Eq 2); s = sub-sample of tasks for the second evaluation (psychometric corrected bootstrapping models).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157914.t001
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Table 2. Miscellaneous studies included in the meta-analysis.
Study Judges Number of
judgments
Number of
cues
Judgment task Criterion Domain Task
results
e) Miscellaneous domains, experts:
29) Stewart [51] 7
meteorologists
75 (25) 6 Assess probability of Observed
event
Meteorology Δ40 = -.01
hail or severe hail based
on radar volume
(*, s)
scans
Both experts and
novices:
30) Stewart, Roebber, &
Bosart [52]
4 I: 169 12 Forecast 24-h maximum
temperature,
I, II: Actual Meteorology I: Δ41 =
.00
(2 students, II: 178 13 12-h minimum
temperature,
temperature II: Δ42 =
.00
2 experts) III: 149 24 12-h precipitation, and III, IV: Actual III: Δ43 =
.00
IV: 150 24 24-h precipitation for each
day
precipitation IV: Δ44 =
.00
(*, +, s)
Novices:
31) Steinmann &
Doherty [53]
22 students 192: 2 Decide which of two
randomly chosen
A hypothetical Other Δ45 = .15
(2 sessions with
96
bags a sequence of chips
had been drawn
“judge” (*, s)
judgments) (▲)
32) MacGregor & Slovic
[54]
I: 25 students I—IV: 4 Estimate the time to
complete a marathon
Actual time to Sport I: Δ46 =
.19
II: 25 students 40 based on runner proﬁles complete the II: Δ47 =
.16
III: 26 students marathon III: Δ48 =
.23
IV: 27 students VI: Δ49 =
.24
(s)
33) McClellan,
Bernstein, & Garbin
26 psychology 128 5 Estimate magnitude of
ﬁns-in and ﬁns-out
Actual
magnitude
Perception Δ50 = .12
[55] students Mueller Lyer stimuli of ﬁns-in and
ﬁns-
(s)
out Mueller
Lyer
stimuli
34) Trailer & Morgan
[56]
75 students 50 11 Predict the motion of
objects based on
Actual motion Intuitive Δ51 = .10
situations in a
questionnaire
physics (*, +, s)
35) Camerer [57] 21 18 — — — — Δ52 = .00
▲ = subjective criterion;
(*) = idiographic approach (cumulating across individuals);
(*, +) = both research approaches are considered;
Δ = the success of bootstrapping models (see Eq 2); s = subsample of tasks for the second evaluation (psychometric corrected bootstrapping models).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157914.t002
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present analysis, we used the two single lens model designs as two different tasks. We identified
six studies within psychological science, in which 105 bootstrapping models of 81 individuals
(including 59 experts) for nine different tasks were available. Finally, we identified seven stud-
ies that did not fit into any of the other domain categories (e.g., studies on the accuracy of
weather forecasts). The studies in the miscellaneous domain included data from 258 individu-
als (9 experts vs. 249 novices) for 13 different tasks and 270 bootstrapping models. Please note
that only Stewart, Roebber, and Bosart [52] directly compared novices and experts across four
meteorological tasks. It is also the only study within the miscellaneous domain to have analyzed
judgment accuracy retrospectively.
In sum, in our meta-analysis we analyzed the results of 35 studies with 1,110 bootstrapping
models, 532 experts, and 578 novices judging 52 tasks across five decision domains. This sam-
ple also includes 365 bootstrapping procedures at the individual level (idiographic approach)
across 28 different tasks.
Second database. The subset of 31 studies (the second database) with sufficient informa-
tion for evaluating the success of bootstrapping with psychometrically-corrected lens model
indices included 1,007 bootstrapping models, covering 44 tasks across five decision domains
(see [11], for more information).
Analytic strategy
Based on our preliminary analysis of the success of individual bootstrapping procedures at the
individual level, we now outline our two analytical strategies. Please keep in mind that in each
of these analytical strategies, a different sample was included, as described above. Moreover, in
line with previous work (see [8, 11]) the analytical level was that of tasks, not studies. The
included effect sizes for the success of the model for each task in our meta-analysis can be
found in the last column in Table 1.
The success of individual bootstrapping procedures. In meta-analysis, an ecological fal-
lacy may arise because associations between two variables at the group level (or ecological
level) may differ from associations between analogous variables measured at the individual
level (see [60]). For this reason, we plotted the success of individual bootstrapping procedures
first before analyzing the aggregated estimation of success of bootstrapping calculated through
meta-analysis (see the next step in the analysis).
Bare-bones meta-analysis. We used the lens model equation to calculate the success of
bootstrapping (see final results column of Table 1 for the indices of the success of bootstrap-
ping models). Our bare-bones meta-analysis strategy was in line with the analysis approach
used by Karelaia and Hogarth [8] in their meta-analysis. Moreover, in line with the review by
Camerer [6] and Karelaia and Hogarth [8], we included the linear knowledge component in
our estimation of bootstrapping success. Hence, we underestimated general success, as the
knowledge component was smaller than 1, leading to a decrease of the model component in
contrast to Kuncel et al. [9], who excluded the knowledge component (G) from their evaluation
of bootstrapping success. Thus, we gained more information about the human judgment and
decision-making strategy than was possible in Kuncel et al. [9].
We followed the Hunter-Schmidt approach to meta-analysis [12]. The Hunter-Schmidt
approach estimates the population effect size by correcting the observed effect size for bias due
to various artifacts, including sampling and measurement error (see [12], p. 41). Specifically,
we corrected for possible sampling bias introduced by the different number of judges in the sin-
gle studies, using what is referred to as bare-bones meta-analysis. We used forest plots to
graphically analyze the results of the bare-bones meta-analysis. We were specifically interested
in whether the success of bootstrapping depended on decision domain, the level of expertise of
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the human judge, or the type of criterion. Hence, for this moderator analysis, we reran the
meta-analysis with a subsample of studies.
In addition to the overall success of models (see the third column in Tables 3 and 4), we also
report the confidence and the credibility intervals (see fourth and fifth columns of Tables 3 and
4). In contrast to confidence intervals, credibility intervals are calculated with standard devia-
tions after removing artifacts and correction of sample bias. If the credibility interval includes
zero or is sufficiently large, there is a higher potential for moderator variables relative to when
the credibility interval is small and excludes zero (for further information, see [61]). We con-
sidered additional estimations of heterogeneity to the Q-test: If this test is significant, modera-
tor variables are indicated (see sixth and seventh columns of Tables 3 and 4). The I2 ([62], see
eighth column of Tables 3 and 4) represents the between-task heterogeneity not explained by
Table 3. Results of the bare-bonesmeta-analysis organized by decision domain and decisionmaker’s expertise.
Domains (expertise) k N Δ SDΔ 95% CI 80% CI Q I2(%) τ2 75%
Medical 14 293 .00 .00 -.10 - .12 .00 - .00 1.3 n.s. 0.00 0.00 1,171
Publ. bias +3 324 .03 .00 -.02 - .04 .03 - .03 39.15** 59.1 0.00 667
Expert 13 288 .01 .00 -.10 - .12 .01 - .01 1.19 n.s. 0.00 0.00 1,262
Publ. bias +2 305 .02 .00 -.02 - .04 .02 - .03 36.59*** 61.7 0.00 895
Novice — — — — — — — — — —
Business 10 244 .02 .00 -.10 - .14 .02 - .02 .49 n.s. 0.00 0.00 2,338
Expert 7 121 .02 .00 -.15 - .20 .02 - .02 .22n.s. 0.00 0.00 3,791
Novice 3 123 .00 .00 -.15 - .19 .02 - .02 .26 n.s. 0.00 0.00 1,146
Publ. bias +1 125 .02 .00 -.01 - .09 .02 - .02 15.38*** 80.5 0.001 1,686
Education 6 198 .11 .00 -.02 - .25 .11 - .11 .68 0.00 0.00 > 10,000
Publ. bias +3 208 .12 .00 .11 - .21 .12 - .12 67.14*** 88.1 0.003 > 10,000
Expert 3 41 .04 .00 -.26 - .34 .00 - .00 .00 n.s. 0.00 0.00 > 10,000
Novice 3 157 .13 .00 -.03 - .28 .13 - .13 .42 n.s. 0.00 0.00 707
Publ. bias +2 162 .13 .00 .11 - .22 .13 - .13 47.16*** 91.5 0.003 1,214
Psychology 9 105 .14 .00 -.05-.33 .14-.14 6.5 n.s. 0.00 0.00 > 10,000
Expert 4 59 .03 .00 -.22 - .28 .03 - .03 .01 n.s. 0.00 0.00 4,971
Publ. bias +2 62 .03 .00 .01 - .10 .03-.03 3.31 n.s. 0.00 0.00 > 10,000
Novice 5 46 .29 .00 .00 - .58 .29 - .29 4.59 n.s. 0.00 0.00 102
Publ. bias +1 47 .30 .00 -.08 - .49 .3 - .3 67.15*** 92.6 0.11 > 10,000
Miscellaneous 13 270 .13 .00 .01 - .25 .13 - .13 1.54 n.s. 0.00 0.00 929
Expert 5 15 .00 .00 -.51 - .50 .00 - .00 .00 n.s. 0.00 0.00 > 10,000
Publ. bias +3 27 -.01 .00 -.23 - .21 -.01 -.01 .00 n.s. 0.00 0.00 > 10,000
Novice 12 255 .14 .00 .02 - .26 .14 - .14 1.25 n.s. 0.00 0.00 1,269
Overall Experts 32 532 .03 .00 -.07 - .10 .03 - .03 1.56 n.s. 0.00 0.00 > 10,000
Publ. bias +5 820 .04 .00 .01 - .05 .04 - .04 53.33** 32.5 0.006 > 10,000
Overall Novices 20 578 .12 .00 .03 - .20 .12-.12 9.65 n.s. 0.00 0.00 > 10,000
Overall 52 1,110 .07 .00 .01 - .13 .07 - .07 14.21n.s. 0.00 0.00 > 10,000
Publ. bias + 12 1,365 .10 .00 .73 - .12 .10 - .10 398*** 84.2 0.005 > 10,000
k = number of judgment tasks;
N = number of success indices;
Δ = the success of bootstrapping models (see Eq 2); SDΔ = standard deviation of true score correlation; 95% CI = conﬁdence interval; 80% CI = 80%
credibility interval including lower 10% of the true score and the upper 10% of the true score; 75% = percent variance in observed correlation attributable
to all artifacts; Publ. bias = publication bias corrected estimation by the trim-and-ﬁll method (see [63]);
+ = the number of missing tasks indicated by the trim-and-ﬁll method.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157914.t003
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the sampling error; values above 25% indicate variation. Moreover, the τ2 is an additional
index for the between-heterogeneity (see the second to last column of Table 3): If τ2 is zero,
this implies homogeneity. Finally, we used the 75% rule as an indication of moderator variables
(see the last column of Tables 3 and 4). That is, moderators were expected whenever artifacts
explained less than 75% of the observed variability.
As mentioned above, for our moderator analysis we reran the analysis for each decision
domain, for experts and for novices, and for the level of expertise in the domain. We also reran
the analysis for each type of evaluation criterion (objective, subjective, or test score) separately.
We then checked our results with a sensitivity analysis. First, we checked for possible publi-
cation bias using the trim-and-fill method (see [63]). This approach estimates the effect sizes of
potentially missing studies and considers them within a new meta-analysis estimation. Second,
we used the leave-one-out approach to check whether the results were influenced by any indi-
vidual task. In this approach, the first task is excluded in an initial meta-analysis. Then in a sub-
sequent analysis, only the second task is excluded. Hence, for example, for our overall meta-
analysis with 52 tasks, 52 separate meta-analyses including 51 tasks were conducted and the
results were compared.
Artifact-corrected lens model indices. To check the robustness of the results of the bare-
bones meta-analysis, we used the subset of k = 31 tasks with sufficient information to evaluate
the success of artifact-corrected bootstrap models using the psychometrically-corrected lens
model components from Kaufmann et al. [11]. In the same way, we also used these databases
with lens model indices corrected by a bare-bones meta-analysis to check the differences
between the two approaches directly. This procedure was also applied in Kaufmann et al. [11].
It should be noted that here, we used meta-analysis-corrected indices, in contrast to the previ-
ously described analytical strategy, in which the indices were not corrected before building the
bootstrapping models. In our presentation of this second analytical strategy, we consider the
five domains and judge expertise.
Results
The success of individual bootstrapping procedures
Fig 2 displays a scatter plot of the success of 365 individual bootstrapping procedures (see Eq
1), organized by domain (marked by color) and decision maker expertise (triangles for experts,
Table 4. Results of the bare-bonesmeta-analysis of the success bootstrapping organized by type of evaluation criterion.
Evaluation criteria k N Δ SDΔ 95% CI 80% CI Q I2(%) τ2 75%
Subjective 4 76 .03 .00 -.19 - .25 .03 - .03 .60 n.s. 0.00 0.00 520
Publ. bias +2 81 .02 .00 -.16 - .06 .02 - .02 44.41*** 88.7 0.01 > 10,000
Objective 33 857 .08 .00 .01 - .14 .08 - .08 4.78 n.s. 0.00 0.01 778
Publ. bias +9 1,020 .10 .00 .06 - .12 .10 - .10 216*** 81.1 0.00 639
Test 15 177 .07 .00 -.08 - .21 .07 - .07 8.68n.s. 0.00 0.00 197
Publ. bias +3 330 -.01 .01 -.12 - .09 -.14 - .11 149.33*** 88.6 0.03 86.14
k = number of judgment tasks;
N = number of success indices;
Δ = the success of bootstrapping (see Eq 2);
SDΔ = standard deviation of true score correlation; 95% CI = conﬁdence interval; 80% CI = 80% credibility interval including lower 10% of the true score
and the upper 10% of the true score; 75% = percent variance in observed correlation attributable to all artifacts; Publ. bias = publication bias-corrected
estimation by the trim-and-ﬁll method (see [63]); + = the number of missing tasks indicated by the trim-and-ﬁll method.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157914.t004
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circles for novices). A value of zero indicates that the model was as accurate as the human
judge; positive values indicate that the model was more accurate than the human judge. The
scatter plot displays the wide variability in the success of the bootstrapping models.
Bare-bones meta-analytic results
Fig 3 shows the forest plots. More than 80% of the tasks (42 of the 52 tasks) were associated
with a positive value, indicating that the bootstrapping models were more accurate than the
human judges. Particularly noteworthy is that bootstrapping was more accurate than human
judgment across all of the tasks within education sciences.
Across all tasks, the results of the bare-bones meta-analysis demonstrated that models were
generally more accurate than human judges (Δ = .071 across all tasks, see Table 3). There was
no indication of moderator variables according to the several heterogeneity indices. In contrast,
our publication bias estimation revealed that 12 tasks may have been missed. The resulting
publication bias-corrected overall estimation of the success of bootstrapping models indicated
the possibility of moderator variables. Although not all heterogeneity indexes confirmed the
possibility of moderator variables, we undertook the moderator analysis to check our results.
Fig 2. Scatter plot of the success of 365 bootstrapping procedures across 28 different tasks
organized by decision domain and decisionmaker expertise.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157914.g002
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As Table 3 shows, if we focus on the expertise level, our analysis revealed overall that the
success of bootstrapping models was greater within the novice category than within the expert
category (.12 vs. .03). Within the different domains, models were generally more successful rel-
ative to novice judgment than relative to expert judgment, with the exception of business
Fig 3. Forest plots of the success of bootstrappingmodels organized by decision domain and
decisionmaker expertise. Positive values indicate that bootstrapping resulted in more accurate judgments
than human judgment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157914.g003
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decisions. Within the business decision domain, models with expert judges were more success-
ful than models with novice judges. There was no indication of moderator variables across the
different heterogeneity indices.
As you see, the results were confirmed by our publication bias estimation within the differ-
ent fields, except in the medical and educational fields, revealing that our results in these areas
may be underestimated (see also the associated confidence intervals) and that additional mod-
erator variables may be indicated.
On the other hand, it should be noted that our leave-one-out approach check revealed that
within the educational field, there was a decrease in the success of bootstrapping models if the
paper by Wiggins et al. (see [43]) was excluded (Δ = .5, -14–24).
If we now assumed some moderator variables within the different fields and focused on the
expertise level (expert vs. novice) within the different fields again, possible publication bias
seemed to be associated with an increased success of bootstrapping except in the ‘miscella-
neous’ field category. Additionally, publication bias-corrected estimation within this miscella-
neous field category and within the psychology expert category revealed, contrary to other
publication bias-corrected estimations, no additional moderator variables.
To summarize, all the different analyses (with and without publication corrections, the
leave-one-out approach) revealed a positive value of the success of bootstrapping models. The
only exception was the publication bias-corrected estimation within the miscellaneous category
considering experts. However, we highlight here that the positive value of the success of boot-
strapping models was not completely confirmed by the 95% confidence intervals but by our
80% credibility interval estimations, which we discuss below.
Additionally to our reported bare-bones meta-analysis, Table 4 displays the results of the
bare-bones meta-analysis separated by evaluation criterion (objective, subjective, or test score).
As Table 4 shows, bootstrapping was more successful when there was an objective criterion
and less successful when a subjective or test score criterion was used at first glance. If we con-
sider the 95% confidence interval, negative success values were revealed within the subjective
and the test categories. Our analysis of evaluation criteria indicated no possible moderator vari-
ables across the different heterogeneity indices. Additionally, in each evaluation criteria cate-
gory, a publication bias was indicated by the trim-and-fill approach. Our reanalysis
considering a possible publication bias affecting the success of bootstrapping suggested that the
success of models was underestimated in the objective evaluation criteria category and overesti-
mated in the subjective evaluation criteria category. Within all evaluation criteria categories,
the publication bias-corrected estimations now indicated possible moderator variables.
Artifact-corrected results
Table 5 displays the results of the success of bootstrap models with psychometrically-corrected
lens model indices (k = 31). These results suggest that the success of bootstrapping was in fact
clearly greater than the results of the bare-bones meta-analysis suggested (.07 vs. .23). If we
compared the results with our previously presented bare-bones meta-analysis (see Table 2),
our conclusion was confirmed. Importantly, it should be noted that the artifact-corrected
results were based on only a subset of the studies included in the bare-bones meta-analysis, as
outlined above. Thus, the results of the previous bare-bones meta-analysis and the artifact-cor-
rected results were not directly comparable. Nevertheless, both results partly indicated that
models were more successful than human judges across all decision domains. Notably, in com-
parison with the results of our previously presented bare-bones meta-analysis, the psychomet-
rically-corrected models indicated a different pattern of results on the success of bootstrapping
across levels of expertise and decision domains (see Table 4).
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Discussion
Like previous reviews [4, 7, 8], we first used a bare-bones meta-analytic procedure [12] to eval-
uate the success of bootstrapping. Unique to the present study was our additional use of psy-
chometrically-corrected bootstrap models, which are based on a previous meta-analysis (see
[11]). These results allowed us to check for various methodological artifacts that may have
biased the results of previous meta-analyses. The major finding of this study is that models lead
to more accurate judgments than individual human judges make across quite diverse domains
(Δ = .07). The results of the present meta-analysis are in line with previous meta-analyses of
the overall success of bootstrapping [6, 8]. Notably, there were 10 tasks in which models were
not superior to human judges. We argue that the results of meta-analysis of the success of boot-
strap models with artifact-corrected lens model indices represent a more accurate estimation of
the success of bootstrapping. Comparison of the results of the success of bootstrap models with
artifact-corrected lens model indices with the results of the bare-bones meta-analysis in the
present study suggests that previous meta-analyses may have underestimated the success of
bootstrapping [4, 7, 8, 9]. Although the estimated success of bootstrapping is only slightly
higher according to the results of the meta-analysis examining the success of bootstrap models
with artifact-corrected lens model indices relative to the bare-bones meta-analysis, the higher
(and more accurate) success estimates are meaningful particularly in high-risk decision-mak-
ing domains like medical science, in which even a small increase in decision accuracy could
lead to many saved lives. In sum, our results support the conclusion that formal models to
guide and support decisions should be developed especially in decision domains where the cost
of inaccurate decisions is high. It should be noted, however, that we used a slightly reduced
subset of tasks in the estimation of the success of bootstrap models with artifact-corrected lens
model indices (the same database as [11]) as compared to the bare-bones meta-analysis, so that
the two estimates of the success of bootstrapping are not directly comparable.
Moreover, we found that there were no systematic differences in the estimated success of
bootstrapping depending on the decision domain. However, we highlight that the success of
bootstrapping was particularly high in the psychological decision domain. Based on the success
of bootstrapping within psychology in the present study, it seems suitable to apply bootstrap-
ping more widely in psychological decision-making tasks in order to overcome the low judg-
ment achievement of psychological experts (see [21, 11]).
The present analyses also considered the potential role of judge expertise in the success of
bootstrapping. The results indicate that not only novices but also experts may profit from boot-
strapping (see also [10]). The results of the bare-bones meta-analysis suggest that mainly
Table 5. The success of bootstrapping according to bare-bones (in brackets) and psychometrically-corrected lens model indices.
Domains k N Δoverallb Δexperts Δnovices
Medical science 10 258 .35 (.01) .35 (-.01) .35 (-.01)
Business 9 239 .018a (-.03) .05a (-.01) .09a (-.02)
Education 4 156 .21 (.12) .18 (.15) .14 (.04)
Psychology 9 105 .08 (.04) .23a (.15) .04 (.04)
Miscellaneous 12 249 .26 (.16) .27a (.16) .01 (-.02)
Overall 44 1,007 .23 (.07) .22 (.13) .17 (.02)
k = number of judgment tasks; N = number of success indices; Δ = estimated success of bootstrapping (see Eq 2).
a = no correction of the Re component, because this component includes only objective criteria.
b = this column is the same as in Kaufmann et al. [11], Table 7, columns 5 and 6.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157914.t005
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novices profit from bootstrapping, whereas the results of the psychometrically-corrected lens
model indices suggest that mainly experts profit from bootstrapping. We note once again that
the samples of studies included in the two analyses differed slightly, and hence, the results are
not directly comparable. In light of the inconsistent results on the relationship between boot-
strapping success and level of judge expertise, we recommend that future studies also consider
expertise as a potential moderator of bootstrapping success. We emphasize that only the study
by Stewart, Roebber, and Bosart [52] compared novices and experts across the same four mete-
orological tasks, and we therefore urge researchers to conduct more studies directly comparing
novice and expert judges.
Finally, in the present analysis, we considered the type of evaluation criterion as a potential
moderator of the success of bootstrapping. Namely, we analyzed the success of bootstrapping
separately for studies in which the accuracy of a decision was based on an objective, subjective,
or test criterion. We believe that future evaluations of bootstrapping success should likewise
consider the type of decision criterion (see also [7] with regards to human and non-human
decision domains). In the present study, we found that bootstrapping was especially successful
when there was an objective criterion for an accurate decision (e.g., [54]). The higher success of
bootstrapping in tasks with an objective criterion is unexpected, since human judges are
thought to receive faster and more definite feedback regarding the accuracy of their decisions
when there is an objective criterion relative to subjective criterion [64]. The results of our anal-
ysis also imply that the results of the meta-analysis by Grove et al. [7] and Aegisdottir et al. [4]
may underestimate the success of bootstrapping, since both of those meta-analyses excluded
studies with tasks predicting nonhuman outcomes (e.g., weather forecasts). Hence it is primar-
ily with objective criteria that bootstrapping appears, based on the present results, to be
particularly successful. Our publication bias-corrected estimation supports our assumption.
However, we note that the sample of studies including subjective criteria is quite small, which
may limit the generalizability of our results.
Taken together, our review confirms previous meta-analyses in the field and contributes new
knowledge on differences in the success of bootstrapping across different decision domains, dif-
ferent levels of expertise of the human judge, and different types of evaluation criteria.
However, a potential point of criticism in our study is that our conclusions are not con-
firmed by our interpretation of the confidence intervals. We argue that the confidence interval
estimations did not consider any sampling bias, which is considered in the credibility intervals
estimations, also reported in our work (see Table 4, 5, [12], p. 228). If we focus on the sampling
bias-corrected credibility intervals, our results are clearly supported, except in two cases. These
two cases are the publication bias-corrected estimation of the success of models in the miscella-
neous expert category and the publication bias-corrected estimation in the evaluation criterion
category test. Hence, we argue that especially within these two categories, the success of models
may be not confirmed. We also emphasize the need for caution in interpreting our publica-
tion-corrected estimations, as these estimations are based on a database without any artifact
corrections such as measurement error. Hence, the heterogeneity of our databases may be over-
estimated due to measurement error (see [11]), leading to an overestimation of a possible pub-
lication bias.
Moreover, it is important to note that the scope of the present meta-analysis was limited to
the success of linear bootstrap models, which represent only one type of formal decision-mak-
ing model. Our analysis of only linear models may overestimate the potential success of boot-
strapping in general (see [9]), since linear models have the problem of overfitting, in contrast
to the fast and frugal non-linear models [65]. Non-linear models are also considered to be
more user-friendly, which may increase their application in real-life settings [16]. Notably, as
an evaluation of the success of artifact-corrected linear models relative to non-linear models
Linear Bootstrapping Models
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0157914 June 21, 2016 18 / 21
has not yet been conducted, it offers an interesting and important avenue for future research.
In addition, we see the need to evaluate how the success of bootstrapping may be affected by
the number of cues provided in decision-making tasks (i.e., to examine whether bootstrapping
is more successful when human judges are provided with more or less information). Further,
we feel that future evaluations of bootstrapping success should consider Brunswik’s symmetry
concept (see [66]). Judgment achievement increases if both the judgment and the criterion are
measured at the same level of aggregation (i.e., if they are ‘symmetrical’). For example, if a phy-
sician is asked to judge whether cancer is present and the criterion is whether a cancer tumor is
detected, then the judgment is not symmetrical, as cancer can exist without a detectable tumor.
In contrast, if a physician is asked to judge whether there is cancer only when a cancer tumor
has been detected, then the judgment and the criterion are said to be symmetrical. We did not
control for symmetry in the present analysis, which may have led to an underestimation of the
lens model components. Future research on whether the symmetry concept moderates the esti-
mated success of bootstrapping would be highly useful in providing a more thorough under-
standing of the contexts in which models make better judges than humans do, leading to
improved judgment accuracy within different domains.
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